Do Parties Matter for Fiscal Policy Choices by Per Pettersson





First version: October 8, 1999
This version: January 26, 2000
Abstract
In this paper I test whether parties matter for fiscal policy choices, i.e., government
spending and level of taxes. It is part of conventional wisdom that the Left spends and
taxes more than the Right. However, there are very few convincing empirical studies that
show this to be the case. I argue that this might reflect either the data sets used, or the
employed methodology. By using a very large cross-section and time-series data set from
Swedish local governments, N=274 and T=21, I avoid many of the difficulties with cross-
country comparisons. I find significant and sizeable partisan effects; left-wing parties
spend and tax more than right-wing parties. These effects are particularly large where the
same party has had a long tenure in office. On average, left-wing parties have 13 percent
higher real spending per capita and 7 percent higher income taxes than do right-wing
parties. I also show that ignoring parameter heterogeneity could lead to biased or
meaningless estimates of partisanship effects. In particular, this issue concerns research,
which are based on the use of OLS or FGLS estimators.
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1. Introduction
In this paper I will investigate whether parties matter for policy choices. It is part
of conventional wisdom that the Left spends and taxes more than the Right. However,
there are very few convincing empirical studies that show this to be the case. From a
theoretical point of view, there is also a debate whether parties should matter for policy
outcomes.
In the theoretical literature, Hotelling (1929), Black (1958) and Downs (1957)
emphasized the tendency of parties in a two-bloc system to converge toward the center. In
these models it is assumed that parties only care about winning. But even if one makes
the additional assumption that parties also care about policy outcomes, Calvert (1985)
shows that there is still “almost” complete convergence. However, Alesina (1988) argue
that the tendency for policy divergence is much stronger than it appears in Calvert’s work
if candidates are unable to credibly commit to carry out their campaign promises.
The absence of a conclusive theoretical answer to the question whether parties
matter makes it ultimately an empirical issue. However, even here we are faced with
conflicting results. Blais, Blake and Dion (1993) review the evidence. Their focus is
mainly on the literature that deals with the overall size of national governments and their
conclusion is that the empirical literature does not offer a clear answer as whether left-
wing parties spend more than right-wing parties.
1 There have also been other studies
                                                
1 Blais et al. (1993) evidence is based on the political science literature. But there is also mixed evidence
from the political economic literature. Alesina et al. (1997) find no partisanship effects on deficit, while
Roubini and Sachs (1989) report that countries with a higher percentage of left-wing governments have
significantly higher long-run government spending to GNP ratios. However, Roubini and Sachs evidence is
only based only on a cross-section regression (N=13) where they have used an estimated long run target3
focusing on the sub-national level, in particular from the American states. For example,
Garand (1988) and Gilligan and Matsusaka (1995) find no support for the partisanship
hypothesis while Alt and Lowry (1994) and Besley and Case (1995) find systematic
differences between Democrats and Republicans.
2 To conclude, these mixed findings are
troublesome for models that posit that different parties simply have different given
preferences over spending and taxation choices.
In this paper I will argue that these mixed findings might reflect either the data
sets used in the empirical tests, or the employed methodology.
The first question we need to ask before embarking on the empirical analysis is
“whether we have found the best available data for the purpose”.
3 In this paper I will
utilize data from Swedish local governments. This buys me several advantages to
previous studies. First I have data for 274 local governments over a 21-year period. Thus,
the total number of observations (5754) is much larger than in any previous study and this
allows me to use much more flexible econometric model specifications. Previous studies
are mainly based on cross-country data. The major problem with national level
comparison is the fact there are always fewer cases available than the number of plausible
relevant differences between the cases. In other words, there is a serious degree of
                                                                                                                                    
value of the share of government spending in GNP as the dependent variable. These estimates are however
consistently higher than the actual figures, in particular for the countries with a high proportion of left-wing
governments.
2 Besley and Case (1994) look at the behavior of U. S. governors and find that states run by a Democratic
governor spend and tax more than states with a Republican governor. Alt and Lowry’s (1994) use the
American state governments as a testing ground. Their empirical evidence is based on a hypothetical
situation; “how parties would behave if they had sufficient unified control to have brought fiscal policy to
desired levels and believed they would govern indefinitely”. However, the partisanship difference is not
significant for observed actual levels of spending.
3 Hamermesh (1999) argues that we too often “mindlessly accept the data that are given us as representing
the economic concept that we seek to include in our estimates”.4
freedom problem. Therefore, the usual approach in the empirical work is to assume
parameter homogeneity; namely that all countries are characterized by the same
regression equation at all points in time. For cross-country comparisons, the parameter
homogeneity assumption seems questionable.
Second, since Swedish local governments operate within a common political
framework there is much less of a problem classifying parties as Left or Right in a
commensurable way.
Third, the fiscal policy variables, expenditures and taxes, are more or less under
the control of the unit of my analysis. In cross-country studies, however, there could be a
problem to isolate the discretionary part of policy choices. For example, many studies use
data from the general government financial account. But these include social security
funds and regional and local government balances. Thus, this type of data mixes the
decisions on fiscal policy from several levels of government.
 Fourth, since Sweden has one of the most party centered election systems among
the OECD countries,
4 it should be easier to isolate the effects of parties on policy choices.
To use a candidate based election system, such as the U.S. system, where the parties are
relatively weak would lead do additional complications about individual vs. party
effects.
5
To investigate whether parties matter for fiscal policy choices also raises some
methodological questions. These questions have largely been ignored in previous work or
else have not been properly addressed. One issue is the previously mentioned parameter
                                                
4 See Johansson and Möller (1998, s. 39).5
homogeneity assumption. From both a theoretical and statistical point of view this
assumption is questionable. Another methodological question is how fast we should
expect parties to make a difference for fiscal policy outcomes? Should we expect a
change in the party composition of government to induce an instantaneous change in
policy orientation, or is it likely to take a long time before the shift occurs? To the extent
that to govern is to inherit previous commitments, we would expect parties to make a
larger difference in the long run.
6 A third issue concerns the measurement of party
preferences. Previous studies have used a dichotomous as well as continuous partisanship
variables. I will argue, from a theoretical point of view, that one should use the
dichotomous one.
Before embarking on the empirical analysis it is necessary to counter a possible
objection to the whole exercise. This is the claim that, because Swedish local
governments have limited autonomy, it is misconceived to look at expenditure as
determined by local political factors. It is argued that local government is largely an agent
of the center. The case I make against the agency claim is both derived from my data
analysis and that the Swedish local governments have the constitutional right of self-
government.
7
The main empirical result from this paper is that parties matter for policy choices.
Left-wing parties spend and tax more than right-wing parties. There is quite a substantial
                                                                                                                                    
5 In the Unites States there is also the additional complication that policy outcomes are the product of a
complex interaction among the two houses of the Congress (State legislature) and the President (Governor).
6 Several theoretical papers that show that the options available to a newly elected government may be
restricted because of the actions taken by previous incumbents (see Persson and Tabellini (1997) and the
references cited therein). In an empirical study, using parts of this data set, Pettersson (1999) finds that the6
difference between the two parties, in particular where the parties have had a long tenure
in office. The short-run difference is in the range of 1 to 4 percent for spending, and in the
range 0.5 to 2 percent for income taxes depending on the specification. The long-run
effect is much larger, in particular where the left wing party has had a long tenure in
office. The difference is 13 percent for spending and 7 percent for taxes. These do not
seem like trivial effects.
Moreover, I also show that some of the methodological issues that have largely
been ignored by previous research have a large impact on the results presented in this
paper. In particular, ignoring parameter heterogeneity could lead to erroneous conclusions
about the partisanship effect. For example, I show that using improper pooling
techniques, i.e., the OLS or the FGLS estimator, could lead us to draw the wrong
conclusion that right-wing governments spend and tax considerably more than do left-
wing governments.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a simple theoretical model
and derives the hypothesis to be tested. Section 3 discusses some methodological
problems that have been largely ignored in previous work. Section 4 describes the data.
Section 5 presents the results. Finally, section 6 concludes.
                                                                                                                                    
level of debt is used strategically by an electoral vulnerable incumbent in order to affect the policies of its
successor.
7 See the appendix about Swedish local governments and their freedom of action.7
2. A Basic Model
In this section I layout a basic model and derive the hypotheses that will be tested
in this paper. The model is taken from Persson and Tabellini (1999), but they built on the
papers by Calvert (1985) and Alesina (1988).
Each voter j in region i has the following preferences over private consumption c






i  + Hi(gi) (1)
where Hi´> 0 and Hi´´<  0. Local government spending gi, which is defined in per capita
terms, is financed by taxing the income of every individual in region i at a common rate
τ i, bounded by 0 ≤   τ i  ≤  1. Income differ across individuals which implies that their
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region i is defined implicitly as E(y
m
i) = 0.5. We also introduce the cost of transforming
private outputs into public goods. We denote this relative cost as x. The local government
budget constraint can now be written as
τ i yi = gi xi (3)
Solving for voter j in region i most preferred level of government spending, g
j
i,
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 We start by assuming two exogenously given candidates in each region i, P =L
and R. Pi’s income level is y
P






i. We interpret the two
candidates as representing two different parties with different ideological positions, one
left-wing and one right-wing. When setting policy candidate L sets g
L

















i is the probability
that candidate L is going to win the election in region i.
Candidate R solves a symmetric problem. The equilibrium outcome of this game
differs with respect to the possibility of commitment to a fixed party platform or not.
We first consider the commitment case. The only equilibrium outcome of this is








Thus, the positive implication of this model is that both parties implement the same level
of expenditures and taxes. In other words, parties do not matter for policy outcomes.
We now consider the no commitment case. Suppose that party L is elected. Then
L sets g
L
i given that p
L
i =1, and likewise R sets g
R
i given that p
L
i=0. Thus, in this case the
positive implication is that the size of government is systematically correlated with the
identity of government. Right-wing governments choose lower spending and taxes than
do left-wing governments.9
3. Methodological issues and the choice of empirical method
The objective of this paper is to test whether parties matter for policy choices
using cross-section and a time-series data (or panel data) from Swedish local
governments. Making a first order approximation of equation (4), the f.o.c of the basic
model, we could in principle estimate an equation of the form
git= α  + λ i (y
L –y
R)it + δ i yit + xitβ i + ε it, i = 1,... ,N; t =1,... ,T (5)
ε it =µ i + π t+ ν it , ν it ∼ IID(0, σ
2
ν )( i )
with  i denoting local governments (or municipalities) and t denoting time. g is
government spending per capita, or the income tax rate since there is a one to one
relationship between these variables via the local government budget constraint. The
variable (y
L-y
R) is going to be proxied by an indicator variable (dummy variable). We
define (y
L-y
R)=1 if there is a left-wing government and zero otherwise.
8 This is the main
variable of interest, if its coefficient λ i is positive and significant then we can conclude
that parties matter for fiscal policy choices. y is the average income. x is a vector of other
variables that might be thought to affect the costs of providing public goods. ε it is an error
term where µ i denotes the unobservable unit effect and π t the unobservable time effect.
The regression equation (5) raises some methodological problems that have been
largely ignored or else have not been properly addressed in empirical tests of whether
parties matter.
                                                
8 The income variable of the two parties should not be interpreted literally.  Instead one can think of that
left-wing parties mainly represent low-income people and right-wing parties mainly represent those with
high income. To identify a possible party effect I make use of a proxy variable: in this case a dummy
variable.10
To begin with, since we have cross-sectional and time-series data there is a
question of the proper pooling technique. This problem is rarely discussed in the
empirical literature that tries to test whether parties matter for fiscal policy choices.
9 The
standard approach is to assume coefficient homogeneity, namely the assumption that all
cross-sectional units are characterized by the same regression equation. If this assumption
is not valid this may lead to false inference.
Another methodological question concerns how one should classify parties as Left
or Right and how to measure party preferences.
A third question is how fast we would expect parties to matter for fiscal policy
outcomes. To the extent that to govern is to inherit previous commitments we would
expect parties to make a bigger difference in the long-run. In other words, if fiscal policy
outcomes are history dependent one must pay attention to dynamics and how one should
measure the short-run and the long-run responses from partisanship on fiscal policy
choices.
In the rest of this section I discuss these methodological issues in more depth.
3.1. The homogeneity assumption
According to the theoretically derived regression equation (5), the parameters
should be allowed to differ between cross-sectional units. These variable coefficient
models have not gained wide acceptance in empirical work; this is partly because of
degrees of freedom problem. For example, Alesina et al (1997) write in a footnote “the
estimates of the coefficients could differ across countries, therefore making the use of a
                                                
9 This problem is also seldom discussed in other cross-sectional and time-series studies.11
variable-slopes and variable intercepts model more appropriate. Given the loss of degrees
of freedom involved, this procedure was not adopted.” The coefficient homogeneity
assumption seems implausible for many applications,
10 in particular in cross-country
comparisons, and can potentially lead to inconsistent and highly misleading estimates of
the coefficients. For example, Robertson and Symons (1992) show that imposing
parameter homogeneity when the regression coefficents should vary across units could
lead to severe biases even for relatively small parameter variations.
11 Nevertheless, the
standard assumption made in the empirical literature is that all units are characterized by
the same regression equation at all points in time.
In the political science literature there are basically two approaches (e.g. see Beck
and Katz 1995, 1996). One is to use ordinary least square (hereafter OLS) with “panel
corrected standard errors”. The other method is to use feasible generalized least squares
(hereafter FGLS), where the disturbance is assumed to capture any differences over time
and units. Then, the two types of estimators, OLS and FGLS, are derived from different
assumption about the error term. More formally, this approach modifies (5) as λ i =λ , δ i
=δ  and β i=β  for all i, and (i) as:
E(ε it)=0, Var (ε
2
it) = σ
2 and Cov(ε it,ε jt’) = 0 for t ≠  t´ or i≠ j (ii)
E(ε it)=0, Var (ε
2
it) = σ i
2 and Cov(ε it,ε jt’) = 0 for t ≠  t´ or i≠ j (iii)
ε it =ρε it-1 + ν it (iv)
ε it =ρ iε it-1 + ν it (v)
                                                
10 See Mairesse and Griliches (1990).
11 A graphical illustration of the possibility of a heterogeneity bias could be find in the introduction to Hsiao
(1986).12
Assumption (ii) is the OLS estimator, while assumption (iii) and (iv) or (iii) and
(v) are two different types of FGLS estimators. The two types differ with respect to the
assumption of the autocorrelation coefficient, i.e., common or unit specific. Beck and
Katz (1995,1996) criticize the use of the FGLS estimators. Instead, their recommendation
is to use OLS parameter estimates but replace the OLS standard errors with panel-
corrected standard errors (hereafter pcse).
In the political economics literature, a common approach (e.g. see for example
Alesina, Roubini and Cohen 1997 or Besley and Case 1995) is to allow intercepts to vary
over units and time but not slope coefficients. Thus, this approach also modify (5) as λ i
=λ , δ i =δ  and β i=β  for all i, but let (i) be unchanged. This model is known as the fixed
effect model (hereafter FE).
3.2. Party classification and measures of party preferences
How should one measure partisan effects on fiscal policy outcomes? The positive
implication from the theoretical model is that the size of government is systematically
correlated with the identity of government. Right-wing governments choose lower
spending and taxes than do left-wing governments. Thus, we should use an indicator
variable, which allows us to separate different governments according their ideological
stance. Let (y
L-y
R)it =1 if there is a left wing government or (y
L-y
R)it = 0 if there is a right
wing government in municipality i at time t. In principle, we should allow the
partisanship effect λ i to differ between municipalities. However, in order to identify a
possible party effect and its magnitude we must impose the assumption that λ i=λ  in13
equation (4).
12 Thus we must be able to argue that qualitatively effect of party on policy
choices is comparable between municipalities.
13 For example, holding all other factors
constant, there should be a high similarity in policy choices between a left wing
government in municipality i to that in municipality k. This assumption seems reasonable
for two reasons. The first reason is that Swedish local governments operate within a
common political framework. The other reason is that Sweden has one of the most party
centered election systems among the OECD countries.
14 Thus, by using data from
Swedish local governments one possibly avoids the problem of matching policies in
cross-country data, that is, to compare like with like between countries.
15 Moreover, one
also avoids the problem with party effects vs. individual legislator effects.
16 Nevertheless,
there is a caveat with this data set. The theoretical model assumes that there is a two party
system. However, the Swedish electoral system is based on proportional representation
but nevertheless I find it reasonable to make the approximation as if it were a two-party
system since there has traditionally been two main opposing party blocs,
 the socialist and
the non-socialist bloc.
17
There has also been other ways of measuring the impact of party on policy
choices, in particular in the political science literature. One of the most favored variables
is the proportion of a government’s legislative seats belonging to the Left. From a
                                                




 for all i and likewise y
R
i = y
R for all i.
13 The problem is similar to postulating that there are qualitative differences regarding sex, race, color,
religion etc.
14 Johansson and Möller (1998, s. 39).
15 See the discussion of cross-country comparison in Alesina et al (1997).
16 Individual behavior has been investigated in the literature of congressional voting. Poole and Rosenthal
(1991), among others, present evidence that senators from the same state but different parties have
significantly different voting records. However this literature does not look at fiscal policy outcomes.
17 Alesina et al (1997), for example, also treat Sweden as a two bloc system.14
theoretical point of view it is doubtful whether this is the correct measure.
18 Moreover, a
large majority may have no more impact on policy than a small majority.
19 In particular in
a proportional representation system like the Swedish one, where a simple numerical
majority is all that is required to monopolize the reins of power. In such a system, the
length of a party’s tenure in office is more likely to be more important than size of its
majority.
3.3 Dynamic issues and short run vs. long run party effects
There are good reasons to believe there is inertia in fiscal policy outcomes. For
example, there are several theoretical papers that show that the options available to a
newly elected government may be restricted because of the actions taken by the previous
incumbent.
20 In an empirical study, using part of this data set, Pettersson (1999) finds that
the level of debt is used strategically by an incumbent government, who is not likely to be
reelected, in order to affect the policies of its successor. Other reasons for inertia could be
the regulation that the central government imposes on the sub-national governments, or
the incremental routines of budget making (e.g. see Wildavsky 1974).
One way of dealing with this issue is to use an autoregressive model, i.e., to
include a lagged dependent variable in equation (5).
21 Since equation (5) is derived from a
                                                
18 Smith (1997) has a discussion of the measurement of party effects in the U.S. context. He argues that the
proportion of seats is a better measure than an indicator variable since it is more in line with the
conceptualization of parties as undisciplined. I have also tried this variable and the results are qualitatively
similar to dichotomous one. See section 5, Table 11.
19 See Kiewiet and McCubbins (1991, 187).
20 See Persson and Tabellini (1997) and the references cited therein.
21 Another way is to introduce autocorrelation in the error term, such as the FGLS estimator. Andersson and
Hsiao (1982) and Maddala (1987) suggest a test whether we should use autocorrelation in the errors or a
lagged dependent variable. With the inclusion of a lagged dependent in a panel data context there are some
estimation problems. There is by now a sizeable literature on different estimation techniques (e.g. see15
static model, we must more or less include the lagged dependent variable in an ad-hoc
fashion.
22
If there is inertia in fiscal policy outcomes then we must also pose the question:
how fast do parties make a difference? Hence, it would be useful to separate the short-run
and the long-run effects of political parties on fiscal policy outcomes. In order to make
this distinction we must be careful of our choice of estimating procedure.
Applied studies using panel data find that the estimators based on the cross-
sectional component of the data tends to give long-run estimates while those based on the
time-series component of the data tends to give short-run estimates.
23
Therefore, the regression equation (5) and the specification of the error term (i)
tend to give short-run estimates since this type of estimator mainly exploits the time
variation in the data. To get the long-run estimates in a dynamic heterogeneous panel,
following Pesaran and Smith (1995), one should use a specification in which each
variable is expressed as time means for each unit. This estimator is known as the between
                                                                                                                                    
Baltagi (1995) and the references cited therein). For example, Judson and Owen (1999), using a Monte
Carlo approach, compare the bias of different dynamic panel data estimators. Their conclusion is to use
GMM or Anderson-Hsiao estimator for large T panels since the bias of the FE-estimator could be sizeable
even when T=20. However, this bias concerns the parameter of the lagged dependent variable, is not clear-
cut from their study, which of the compared estimators performs best concerning the bias of the parameters
of the other regressors. Since the main interest of this paper is the party effect and not the lagged dependent
variable per se, it is not obvious which estimator to use.
22 Some papers (e.g. Borge and Rattsö 1995, Bergström, Dahlberg and Johansson 1999, and Alt and Lowry
1999) include the lagged dependent variable by using the analogy with a stock adjustment model. In this
type of model the assumption is that the desired level of the dependent variable Y*t is dependent on the
current level of the explanatory variables Xt. Then it is postulated an partial adjustment process Yt – Yt-1=
γ (Y*t-Yt-1) and 0 < γ  <1. Thus this equation specifies that the change in Y will respond only partially to the
difference between the desired stock of Y and the past value of Y, with the rate of response being a function
of the adjustment coefficient γ .
23 See Baltagi and Griffin (1984).16
estimator. In this way one would get consistent estimates of the long-run effects,
 24  unless
the time dimension is too short.
In summary, in this section I have discussed some methodological issues that have
been largely ignored or else have not been properly addressed in empirical tests of
whether parties matter. My purpose of this methodological discussion is to show that
these issues actually have an impact on the results presented in this paper and ignoring
them could lead to erroneous conclusions.
4. Data
My objective is to test whether parties matter for policy outcomes using data on
Swedish local governments. As the dependent variables, I will use current direct general
expenditures and the personal income tax rate.
25 Expenditures are expressed in per capita
terms and in 1991 years prices and the tax rate is expressed in percent.
26 As a backdrop to
the investigation, Table 1 presents summary statistics for the spending and the income tax
rate during the sample period 1974-1994. These statistics provide a condensed history of
municipality budgets.
A more and less steady upward trend in expenditure per capita and tax rates can
be seen from Table 1. Real spending has increased with a factor 1.8 while the tax rates
                                                
24 Pesaran and Smith (1995) show that the FE estimator does not give consistent estimates of the long-run
effects in a dynamic heterogeneous panel.
25 I have also used total expenditure and find similar results. However, Statistics Sweden (SEB) has changed
its definition of this variable during my sample period, therefore I feel more confident reporting the results
from current direct general expenditures. The difference between total and current direct expenditures is
mainly that investments are included in the former. Roughly 85 percent of total spending is classified as
current direct spending.
26 I have used the implicit GDP deflator. The deflator is constructed by taking the ratio of GDP at current
market prices to GDP at fixed market prices.17
have increased with a factor 1.4. The standard deviation for spending starts at 19 percent
of the mean and declines to roughly 14 percent. Thus, it seems that the municipalities are
more similar regarding spending today than previously. However, the standard deviation
for taxes is roughly at 7 percent of the mean during the whole period. The maximum
spending is typically more than twice the minimum, while the maximum tax rate is a
factor 1.8 larger than the minimum.
The main focus of this study is on partisanship effects on fiscal policy choices. To
measure the partisanship effect I make use of a dummy variable, that is a variable that is
equal to one when there is a left-wing majority in parliament, and zero otherwise.
27 Table
2 summarizes the number of left and right-wing governments every election period during
the sample period. Thus of the total of 5754 (274× 21) observations from local
governments there was a left-wing majority 2430 (810× 3) and a right-wing majority 2412
(804× 3) of the times.
There is a caveat in the interpretation of this partisanship variable. At the local
level, there are several small parties not included in the two major blocs, the socialist or
the non-socialist bloc, and sometimes these parties hold the balance of power. I call these
kinds of constellations undefined blocs.
28 These undefined blocs create a problem
because there is no general information about the constellation of parties this bloc is
constituted of. Therefore, I have to include a separate indicator variable for this group of
                                                
27 The socialist bloc includes the Leftist Party and the Social Democratic Party. The non-socialist bloc
includes three parties: the Conservative Party, the Centrist Party and the Liberal Party, from 1974 until
1988. Since 1988 it includes a fourth party: the Christian Democratic Party. In 1991 election there was a
fifth part included in the non-socialist bloc: the New Democratic Party.
28 This classification is compiled from the distribution of seats in local councils. If either of the blocs
receive more than 50 percent of the seats it is defined accordingly, otherwise it is an undefined bloc.18
municipalities (912 of the observations) so that the interpretation of party measure for the
left-wing majority could be correctly interpreted as the difference between Right and Left
majorities.
29
It could be interesting to know the Pearson correlation coefficient between the two
dependent variables and the indicator variable of the left wing majority. The correlation
between spending and the indicator variable is 0.25 while the correlation between taxes
and the indicator variable is 0.17.
I also include other explanatory variables in the regression equation (5). Apart
from the fixed effects (both time and unit effects), the party indicator and the average
income I include variables that tries to measure the cost of providing local public goods
as suggested from the basic model. These variables are the proportion of the population
between the ages 0 to 15, the proportion of the population over age 65, population
density, and the municipality population size. Some of these variables can also be seen as
a control of the mandatory part of municipality spending. In particular the ages structure
since the main expenditures of Swedish municipalities are education, childcare and the
care of the elderly and these expenditures therefore fall more heavily on municipalities
with a large fraction of young or elderly people. The population density and the
population size are included because they capture the possibility that there are potentially
congestion effects or scale economies in the provision of local government services.
Another explanatory variable that might be included is intergovernmental grants.
However, this variable is not exogenous with respect to fiscal decisions since the largest
                                                
29 My empirical results are robust to the inclusion or exclusion of this extra indicator variable. However, my
results are slightly stronger if I include it.19
part of the intergovernmental grants during the sample period was matching grants.
30
Therefore, it should not be apart of the explanatory variables.
31 Table 3 presents
descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables.
                                                
30 About 80 percent of the total grants were matching grants while 20 percent was grant-in-aid. Even the
grant-in-aid program was determined by the fiscal behavior of the municipalities. For a description of the
grant-in aid system in Sweden see Aronsson and Wikström (1996).
31 To see this we can rewrite the government budget constraint (3) as τ i yi = gi xi +gis, where s is the rate of






(xi+s)/yi]. Since I have include time effects in (5) I will implicitly control for s (and for time varying s) in
the empirical analysis. Nevertheless, if some parts of the governmental grants is non-matching and
municipality specific, then my estimates of the party effect could possible be biased by not including
governmental grants as an explanatory variable. Therefore I re-run all my regression by including it as an
explanatory variable. I find virtually the same results as reported in the paper. These results are available
upon request.20
5. Results
In this section I report evidence whether parties matter for policy choices. I will
also show that if one does not properly address the methodological issues raised in
section 3, it will lead to biased inference and possibly wrong conclusions about both the
quantitative and qualitatively effects of partisanship.
But before I focus on the specific findings, I will make some general comments on
the results from the different methodologies of pooling cross-section and time series data.
To begin with, I allow for both varying intercept (fixed unit and time effects) and slope
coefficients. It might seem excessive also to allow for different slope coefficients since
my sample is so homogenous to start with. However, the purpose is to show that my
results concerning the partisanship effect are robust even for the most flexible
specification. A halfway house is to use the FE estimator, allowing for different unit and
time effects. This estimator seems to do a good job picking up the heterogeneity in my
sample and at the same time avoiding the pitfalls of the less flexible estimators such as
the OLS and the FGLS.
5.1 Short-run effects of partisanship on fiscal policy
Table 4, 5, 6 and 7 show the results from the short-run fiscal effects of
partisanship. Table 4 and 5 present the results from the effect of partisanship on spending
and Table 6 and 7 on taxes. In all these tables I allow both intercepts and slope
coefficients to differ between municipalities in various degrees.
Before I focus on the partisanship variable, several broad observations can be
made about the regressions in table 4 to 7. First, the regressions account for 90 to 9521
percent of the variation in expenditures and 92 to 97 percent of the variation in taxes
depending on the specification. This is suggestive of that the main fundamental
explanatory variables have been captured. Secondly, income and population density both
has significant and negative effects on expenditures and taxes. Population size has mainly
a negative effect on the two policies, while the demographic variables overall has a more
or less positive effect (although there are some exceptions).
Looking first at expenditure policy, Table 4 and 5 (The difference between Table
4 and 5 is that lagged spending is included in Table 5). Each column is a regression where
I potentially allow the slope coefficients to differ between municipalities for the
explanatory variables. In columns II through VI (Table 4) and II through VII (Table 5), I
only allow one slope coefficient to differ at a time while in last column in each table they
are all unconstrained. As a comparison, the first column in each table shows the FE
estimator (i.e., only the fixed unit effects and time effects are allowed to differ). The main
result to note, in the top row of each table, is that the partisanship effect is positive and
highly statistically significant in all regressions (except for the last column in each table,
which I will discuss below). From these two tables we can see that there are strong
partisanship effects. Left spends and taxes more than Right. In Table 4, not controlling for
lagged spending, the difference is between X to 1134 SEK per capita (roughly 1 to 4 % of
average spending) depending on the specification. For the specifications with lagged
spending, Table 5, the difference is between X to 517 SEK per capita (roughly 0.5 to 2 %
of average spending). It is only in the most flexible specification that the effect is not
statistically significant from zero. However, considering that there are 1665 and 193922
explanatory variables in each of these specifications respectively, there is no surprise that
the standard deviation is large.
Next we turn to income taxes. We replicate the same battery of statistical
techniques as used to analyze expenditures. Table 6 and 7 show the results from
partisanship effects on the level of income taxes. Again, the main result to note, in the top
row of each table, is that the party effect is positive and highly statistically significant in
all regressions (except for the last one Table 7). The range is between 0.18 to 0.30
percentage points (roughly 1 to 2 % of the average tax rate) for the specification without a
lagged dependent variable and 0.02 to 0.13 percentage points for the dynamic one points
(0.1 to 0.8 % of the average tax rate).
Finally, I will make some general remarks on the dynamic specification, i.e.,
including a lagged dependent variable. From Table 5 and 7, we can see that the lagged
dependent variable is strongly significant in all regressions and that the coefficient of the
party indicator variable is affected by its inclusion. We can make a formal of test of the
dynamic specification along the lines of Andersson and Hsiao (1982) and Maddala
(1987). Using this test, I can not reject that we should not include a lagged dependent
variable. Thus, dynamics seem to be important and it also has an impact on the
quantitative effects of partisanship.
5.2 Long-run effects from partisanship on fiscal policy
Table 8 presents the long run estimates. Parties make a bigger difference in the
long-run. From this table we can see that the coefficients of the long-run partisanship
parameter are at least twice as large as their short-run counterparts for the spending23
regressions and at least three times as large for tax regressions. In particular, the
partisanship effect is much larger for parties with a long tenure in office. For example, we
can compare the partisanship effects between municipalities, which have had the same
party in charge during the sample period.
32 This long-run effect can be seen from Column
V and VI. In this case, the left-wing governments spend on average 3340 SEK per capita
(which is 13 percent of average spending) more than, and have an income tax rate that is
9 percentage points (which is 7 percent of the average tax rate) higher than do right-wing
governments.
5.3 Pitfalls using OLS or FGLS estimators
Next we will consider the parameter homogeneity model that have figured
prominently both in the political science and in the political economic literature. I will
show that the parameter homogeneity assumption is highly questionable and can lead to
erroneous conclusion about both the quantitative and the qualitatively effect of
partisanship.
I begin by presenting the results from the OLS and the FGLS estimator. Table
Tables 9 present the result from OLS estimator while Table 10 presents the results from
the FGLS estimator. In the OLS case, I have made the panel data correction of the
standard errors as suggested by Beck and Katz (1995a).
 What is noticeable from tables is that coefficient of partisanship effect is negative
and significant in all the FGLS regressions and negative but not significant in one of the
OLS regressions. This is indeed surprising in light of the previous findings, but as for
                                                
32 There have been a total of 114 municipalities where there has not been any change of power during the24
example Hsiao (1986) illustrates this type of bias can arise if one does not properly
account for the heterogeneity in panel data. To backup this claim, we can make some
formal test of parameter homogeneity. For example,
33 an F-test of joint significance of
fixed unit and time effects is strongly rejected for all regressions in Table 9 and 10.
Moreover, we can also test whether the slope coefficient should differ, i.e, β i=β  for all i.
Table 4 to Table 7 presents the F-tests conditional on that only one slope coefficient at a
time is allowed to differ. This restriction is more or less rejected in all specifications.
The other OLS regressions where the coefficient estimates are positive, column I
to 3 in Table 9 also beg some comments. To include a lagged dependent variable in the
OLS regression was suggested by Beck and Katz (1995b) as superior alternative than to
use the FGLS estimator to model dynamics. It is well known (or should be at least) that
using OLS with a lagged dependent variable in a panel data context renders the OLS
estimator biased and inconsistent.
34 Moreover, it seems that the OLS estimator without a
lagged dependent variable does not make a distinction between short and long-run effects
of partisanship. In comparison to the previous results, the estimates are both much lower
than the long-run estimates and much higher than the short-run estimates.
5.4 Extension and further robustness checks
 In this section I will make some extensions and further robustness checks of my
results. To begin with, I will show that my results are robust to a different measure of
partisanship preferences. In section 2 I argued that the theoretically correct way of
                                                                                                                                    
period 1974 to 1994. Of these 69 where left-wing and 45 right-wing governed
33 Baltagi (1995) has a whole chapter of different tests for individual and time effects.
34 For example, see Trognon (1978) for the asymptotic bias in dynamic panel data models.25
measuring partisanship preferences was to use a dichotomous variable. Nevertheless,
many studies have used a continuous variable such as the proportion of legislative seats
belonging to the Left. I have also used this variable and all of the results previously
presented are qualitatively unchanged. Table 11 shows the results from the FE estimator
when I make use of this measure.
35 From this table we can see that the coefficient is
positive and highly statistically significant in all specifications.
Another robustness check is to test for parameter stability, that is, structural
breaks at certain point in time. This is particularly important when one considers evidence
for a relatively long time period (21 years). To investigate this issue I re-specify equation
(5). Now I allow the slope parameters to vary over time but not over units, except for
partisanship variable. I still use fixed time and unit effects. Tables 12 and 13 show the
results. We can see from these two tables that the results of the partisanship effect on
fiscal policy variables are robust to varying slope coefficients over time.
                                                
35 Due to space constraints I have chosen to only present the results from the FE estimator. The other results
are available from the author.26
6. Conclusions
The main finding of this paper is that parties matter for fiscal policy outcomes in a
large panel data set from Swedish local governments. Left wing parties spend and tax
more than right wing parties. The short-run difference is in the range of 1 to 4 percent for
spending, and in the range 0.5 to 2 percent for taxes depending on the specification. The
long-run effect is much larger, in particular where the left wing party has had a long
tenure in office. The difference is 13 percent for spending and 7 percent for taxes. These
do not seem like trivial effects.
In this paper, I also argue that the lack of convincing empirical support for
partisanship differences in previous studies is possible due to the data sets used or the
employed methodology. For example, Hamermesh (1999) argues that we too often
“mindlessly accept the data that are given us as representing the economic concept that
we seek to include in our estimates”. His advice is that we first should ask the seemingly
obvious question “whether we have found the best available data for the purpose” before
embarking on the empirical analysis. Cross-country studies are fraught with the
difficulties of comparing parties in a commensurable way. Moreover, Persson and
Tabellini (1999) argue that different electoral system have different incentives regarding
fiscal policy outcomes, which makes the identification of a possible partisanship effect
even more difficult. To use data from individual countries with a weak party system, such
as the U.S, could also be problematic since one have to deal with individual legislator
effects vs. party effects. In this paper I utilize data from Swedish local governments. This
buys me several advantages to previous studies. First I have data for 274 local27
governments over a 21-year period. Thus, the total number of observations (5754) is
much larger than in any previous study. Second, Swedish local governments operate
within a common political framework so there is much less of a problem classifying
parties as Left or Right in a commensurable way. Third, Sweden is one of the most party
centered election systems among the OECD countries. Thus, this data set is highly
suitable for the question asked in this paper.
In this paper, I also show that the some of the previously used methodologies for
pooling cross-section and time-series data lead to erroneous results. In particular, ignoring
parameter heterogeneity would lead to erroneous conclusions about the partisanship
effect. For example, I show that using improper pooling techniques, i.e., the OLS or the
FGLS estimator, could lead us to conclude that right-wing governments spend and tax
considerably more than do left-wing governments.28
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Appendix: Swedish Local Governments and their freedom of
action
The public sector in Sweden has three levels: national, regional (county) and local
(municipal). Local self-government is exercised at both the county and the municipality
level. In 1997, Sweden was divided into 23 counties and 288 municipalities. In this paper
we focus on the behavior of the municipalities.
Local governments play an important role in the Swedish economy, both in terms
of the allocation of functions among different levels of government and in terms of
economic significance. They are, for example responsible for the provision of day care,
education, care of the elderly, and social welfare services. In trying to quantify their
economic importance, one can note that
•   During the 1980s and the 1990s, the total consumption of the local governments
constituted approximately 20 percent of GDP.
•   During the same period, the total expenditures of local governments amounted to
roughly 25 percent of GDP.
•   The local governments are the single biggest employer in the economy
(approximately 25 percent of all employed are employed by the local governments)
•   The local governments have a large stock of debt (roughly 30 percent of GDP).
There is in Sweden a very long tradition cherishing local self-government. This
principle of local-self government is written into the Swedish Constitution. The decision
making power of local governments is exercised by elected assemblies, municipality
councils. The members of the councils are elected for three-year terms. The elected32
representatives are responsible for the administration, implementing and the drafting of
decisions. In principle, politicians thus control Swedish local government at all stages.
Local authorities have the constitutional right to set their own personal income
tax.
36 In 1994, the average personal income tax was about 19 percent but the range was
between 13 percent and 22 percent. On average, 57 percent of their revenues come from
the income tax. Fees, loans and other sources constitute 21 percent of total revenues,
while intergovernmental grants make up 22 percent. Thus, roughly 80 percent of local
government revenues are in principle at their own discretion.
Swedish municipalities have the statutory rights to borrow money. The domestic
and international credit markets decide the limits and terms of such loans. For example,
some local governments have been borrowing money from abroad and they have
therefore been credit rated at rating firms such as Standard & Poor. A consequence of
their right to borrow is that there is large cross-sectional variation of the level of debt. For
example, in 1994 the average level of debt was 14900 SEK per capita and the standard
deviation was 6200.
37 The minimum level of debt was 4000 and the maximum 49400
SEK per capita
Local government operations could be divided into mandatory and voluntary
areas. Examples of mandatory tasks are education and social services. Examples of
voluntary tasks are cultural affairs, recreational programs and technical operations such as
energy distribution. Murray (1985) estimated that about 44 percent of the expenditures
are to be considered obligatory. However, there are large differences in the freedom of
                                                
36 There have been some restrictions in the right to set taxes during the 1990s.
37 100 SEK is about $12 dollars.33
action in running a mandatory operation due to variations in the constraints imposed by
legislation. Thus, Local governments could decide on least 56 percent of their own
expenditures. To put this statement in perspective we can look at the cross-sectional
variation in expenditures. During the period 1974 to 1994, the average expenditures was
about 28 000 SEK per capita in real terms and the standard deviation roughly 5200. Thus,
their is quite a bit of cross-sectional variation.
Finally, the State plays no part in either monitoring or approving local government
accounts. However, there has existed a balanced budget requirement, but this requirement
was only a prospective or beginning of year balance and there are several studies that
show that this is not an effective constraint on deficit behavior.
38
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Table 1. Municipality Expenditure per Capita and Tax Rates
Direct current general expenditures
a Taxes
a
Year Mean Std d. Min Max Mean Std d. Min Max
1974 18281 3543 11888 36669 14.11 0.93 10.10 16.85
1975 18913 3404 12851 35899 14.57 1.01 10.10 17.00
1976 20108 3550 13745 37175 14.88 0.99 10.10 17.25
1977 21864 3755 15266 38737 15.12 1.01 10.60 17.50
1978 22651 3868 14932 40044 15.73 1.05 10.60 18.60
1979 24106 4088 15975 42357 15.86 1.09 10.60 18.60
1980 24366 4188 17080 42795 15.92 1.08 10.60 18.60
1981 25095 4266 17723 45138 16.06 1.09 10.60 18.60
1982 26163 4320 18259 47269 16.11 1.10 10.60 18.60
1983 26755 4320 18657 46695 16.21 1.09 10.60 19.60
1984 27145 4322 18512 46667 16.25 1.10 10.40 19.60
1985 27699 4533 19956 47641 16.27 1.12 9.70 19.60
1986 28348 4431 19602 46976 16.23 1.06 11.30 18.00
1987 29236 4580 21534 49812 16.26 1.09 10.90 18.00
1988 27461 3854 19305 41371 16.36 1.12 10.90 18.00
1989 27603 3940 19848 41934 16.41 1.09 11.40 18.00
1990 28773 4064 20063 43538 16.49 1.07 11.40 18.25
1991 29534 4292 19725 44058 16.52 1.05 11.40 18.00
1992 34116 4632 22289 48025 19.03 1.30 13.20 21.70
1993 33828 4922 23032 47181 19.13 1.39 13.15 21.93
1994 33893 4810 22901 49910 19.14 1.38 13.15 21.93
74-94 26471 6089 11888 49910 16.32 1.71 9.70 21.93
Each row report summary statistics for 274 municipalities. Spending is expressed in 1991 SEK per capita.
a In 1992 there was a there was a care of the elderly reform in which the municipalities overtook most of the
responsibilities for the care of the elderly that had previously been handled by the county councils.35
Table 2. Partisanship summary
Election period






1974-1976 116 123 35
1977-1979 110 130 34
1980-1982 121 115 38
1983-1985 144 84 46
1986-1988 125 100 49
1989-1991 122 89 63
1992-1994 72 163 39
Sum 1974-1994 810 804 304
a. In Sweden there is an election every third year.
Table 3. Descriptive statistics for the explanatory variables
Variables Mean Standard d. Min Max
Proportion
young, 0-15
0.21 0.028 0.13 0.37
Proportion old,
65+
0.17 0.045 0.016 0.41
Mean income 73778 12488 15943 162960
Population size 27799 45523 3480 692954
Population
density
107 360 0.28 3700
Average income is expressed in per capita terms and in 1991 prices.36
Table 4. Effect of partisanship on the level of spending: a static specification
Dependent
variable
Spending Spending Spending Spending Spending Spending Spending












































































































Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time
effects




























2 0.8965 0.9204 0.9191 0.9262 0.9220 0.9260
#  of obs. 5724 5724 5724 5724 5724 5724 5724
Average income is expressed in per capita terms and in 1991 prices.
White standard errors were used in calculating t-statistics.
F(273,5180) critical value 1.1537
Table 5. Effect of partisanship on the level of spending: a dynamic specification
Dependent
variable
Spending Spending Spending Spending Spending Spending Spending Spending
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2 0.9482 0.9528 0.9516 0.9517 0.9535 0.9524 0.9534
#  of obs. 5480 5480 5480 5480 5480 5480 5480 5480
Average income is expressed in per capita terms and in 1991 prices.
White standard errors were used in calculating t-statistics.
F(273,4906). critical value 1.1538
Table 6. Effect of partisanship on the level of taxes: a static specification
Dependent
variable
Taxes Taxes Taxes Taxes Taxes Taxes Taxes
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2 0.9209 0.9441 0.9424 0.9484 0.9437 0.9487
#  of obs. 5724 5724 5724 5724 5724 5724 5724
Average income is expressed in per capita terms and in 1991 prices.
White standard errors were used in calculating t-statistics.
F(273,5180)39
Table 7. Effect of partisanship on the level of taxes: a dynamic specification
Dependent
variable
Taxes Taxes Taxes Taxes Taxes Taxes Taxes Taxes
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2 0.9702 0.9732 0.9729 0.9730 0.9742 0.9731 0.9743
#  of obs. 5480 5480 5480 5480 5480 5480 5480 5480
Average income is expressed in per capita terms and in 1991 prices.
White standard errors were used in calculating t-statistics.
F(273,4906)40
Table 8. Long-run effects of partisanship on spending and taxes
Dependent
variable
Spending Taxes Spending Taxes




























































2 0.5993 0.4844 0.6184 0.6450
#  of obs. 5754 5754 2457 2457
Average income is expressed in per capita terms and in 1991 prices.41
Table 9. The OLS estimator with panel corrected standard errors
Dependent
variable
Spending Spending Taxes Taxes


































































No No No No
T i m e  e f f e c t s N oN oN oN o
R
2 0.4278 0.9085 0.2862 0.8641
#  of obs. 5724 5480 5724 5480
Average income is expressed in per capita terms and in 1991 prices.42
Table 10. The FGLS estimator
Dependent
variable
Spending Spending Taxes Taxes



























































No No No No
T i m e  e f f e c t s N oN oN oN o
R
2 ----
#  of obs. 5724 5724 5724 5724
Average income is expressed in per capita terms and in 1991 prices.43
Table 11. Proportion of left-wing seats
Dependent
variable
Spending Spending Taxes Taxes


































































Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2 0.8964 0.9482 0.9213 0.9702
#  of obs. 5724 5480 5724 5480
Average income is expressed in per capita terms and in 1991 prices.
White standard errors were used in calculating t-statistics.44
Table 12. The variable intercept ,and time varying slope coefficient model
Dependent variable Spending Taxes
Variables I II








Interacted with time effects Interacted with time effects
Proportion
old 65+
Interacted with time effects Interacted with time effects
Population size Interacted with time effects Interacted with time effects
Income Interacted with time effects Interacted with time effects
Population density Interacted with time effects Interacted with time effects
Unit specific effects Yes Yes
Time effects Yes Yes
R
2 0.9108 0.9252
#  of obs. 5724 5724
Average income is expressed in per capita terms and in 1991 prices.
White standard errors were used in calculating t-statistics.
Table 13. The dynamic, variable intercept ,and time varying slope coefficient model






Lagged dependent variable Interacted with time effects Interacted with time effects
Proportion
young 0-15
Interacted with time effects Interacted with time effects
Proportion
old 65+
Interacted with time effects Interacted with time effects
Population size Interacted with time effects Interacted with time effects
Income Interacted with time effects Interacted with time effects
Grants Interacted with time effects Interacted with time effects
Population density Interacted with time effects Interacted with time effects
Unit specific effects Yes Yes
Time effects Yes Yes
R
2 0.9532 0.9719
#  of obs. 5450 5450
Average income is expressed in per capita terms and in 1991 prices.
White standard errors were used in calculating t-statistics.